​In Docket No. ER22-2968,  on September 30, 2022, as supplemented on February 14, 2023, SPP submitted proposed revisions to Attachment V (Generator Interconnection Procedures (GIP)) of its OATT to implement a new pro forma Facilities Service Agreement (FSA).  In SPP, an interconnection customer is responsible for 100% of the costs of network upgrades needed to accommodate its interconnection request.   Article 11.4 in SPP’s pro forma GIA provides two options for funding the costs of network upgrades for generator interconnection.   Under the first option, the interconnection customer pays for the network upgrade costs upfront during construction (Generator Upfront Funding).  Under the second option, the transmission owner can unilaterally elect to provide the upfront funding for the capital cost of the network upgrades (Transmission Owner Initial Funding).  SPP’s OATT did not contain provisions pertaining to how an interconnection customer would reimburse the transmission owner under the second option.
In the pro forma FSA, SPP proposed that the interconnection customer reimburse the transmission owner for a return on and of the capital costs of the network upgrades and system protection facilities needed for the interconnection customer’s interconnection service.  Specifically, SPP proposes a default 20-year term over which the interconnection customer reimburses the transmission owner through a monthly network upgrade charge.  The network upgrade charge is calculated using a formula rate that is based on the FSA’s term and the transmission owner’s Attachment H formula rate using data from the previous calendar year.  Additionally, the pro forma FSA requires that the interconnection customer post security in the amount of the initial capital cost, which may be reduced pro rata over the FSA’s term.  SPP stated that it also proposed revisions to its GIP and its pro forma GIA to effectuate certain provisions related to the pro forma FSA and the transmission owner’s election of Transmission Owner Initial Funding.
FERC found that the nonbinding notice by the transmission owner indicating it intends to fund network upgrades could lead to greater uncertainty for interconnection customers as the transmission owner could later change its election which could cause risk and uncertainty and delays for interconnection customers and could lead to late-stage withdrawals and attendant delays in administering the generator interconnection queue.  SPP contended that its filing and nonbinding transmission owner elections is substantially similar to generator interconnection procedures the Commission has accepted in MISO.  FERC disagreed, as MISO proposed, and FERC accepted, revisions to its tariff to add deadlines by which transmission owners must make both non-binding and binding elections of Transmission Owner Initial Funding prior to the start of the GIA negotiation phase.   The SPP proposal included only the non-binding indication provision during the first phase of SPP’s DISIS process.  FERC rejected the SPP OATT changes.  Therefore, though the SPP OATT provides for transmission owner funding of network upgrades, it still lacks provisions pertaining to how an interconnection customer would reimburse the transmission owner.    

​In an Order on Rehearing in Docket No. EL22-34, FERC continued to find that the Ohio Office of Consumer Council (OCC) demonstrated that the Ohio Power and AEP Ohio Transmission (AEP) rates were unjust and unreasonable since FERC specifically granted them an RTO Adder under section 219, and their continued participation in a Transmission Organization is not voluntary and the RTO Adder should be removed from their rates.  By contrast, OCC did not meet its burden to show that Duke and ATSI rates charged to Ohio customers were unjust and unreasonable as FERC had not specifically granted them an RTO Adder under section 219 and their rates, inclusive of any RTO Adder, were instead parts of comprehensive settlements.   While OCC is correct that an applicant may make a section 205 filing in order to recover an RTO Adder in its rates, it does not follow that the Commission, in approving comprehensive settlement packages, specifically authorized RTO Adders in the section 205 proceedings that resulted in ATSI and Duke’s rates.  Rather, in ATSI’s and Duke’s proceedings, even if the statements in the settlements indicated that the parties agreed to include an RTO Adder, FERC only approved comprehensive settlement packages without specifically approving the RTO Adder under section 219.  FERC does not know the precise trade-offs and concessions made by the parties to those proceedings.  Even if the settlements included an amount reflecting an RTO Adder, that does not explain how that RTO Adder came to be included in the settlement agreements and what trade-offs led to that outcome.  It is FERC’s position not to revisit individual elements in a settlement unless it is shown that they make the overall rate unjust and unreasonable.    
FERC found in the Rehearing Order that it had not err, as stated by AEP, by declining to address preemption arguments and whether the voluntariness requirement is consistent with the plain text of section 219.   FERC previously addressed those issues in the RTO Adder Order and in the Dayton Orders. 
 
In summary, FERC has eliminated the RTO Adder for Dayton Power and Light, Duke and ATSI for their Ohio transmission services. 
Commissioner Danly continues to dissent as the Federal Power Act does not limit incentives to those utilities that voluntarily join a transmission organization, though he did concur with the decision not to reduce the rates of ATSI and Duke.